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NOTES
REMOVAL OF INTOXICATED DRIVERS FROM
MISSOURI ROADS: A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Persons whose driving ability is impaired by use of alcohol are
involved in an appalling number of traffic accidents.1 From this fact
it appears conclusive that existing laws have been ineffective in re-
moving drinking drivers from the roads. In Missouri there are two
principal reasons for this ineffectiveness. First, it is extremely diffi-
cult to obtain and get before the jury convincing evidence of intoxi-
cation in any case in which the driver is not extremely or insensibly
drunk. Second, driving while intoxicated is a felony,2 the severity
of the punishment for which serves to deter prosecutors from indict-
ing and juries from convicting, especially since one may be convicted
if his operation of an automobile is impaired in any manner. This
note will examine the problem in the perspective of prevailing evi-
dentiary and constitutional limitations, with particular regard to the
Missouri situation. A positive approach toward solution of the
problem will then be suggested.
I. EVIDENCE PROBLEMS IN DRINKING DRIVER CASES
There are scientifically accurate methods now recognized and in
use by which the degree of intoxication can be determined by chem-
ically testing body fluids.3 However, unless the results of such tests
can be admitted into evidence, there is little hope of utilizing them to
convict any driver who is not decidedly drunk. Since one may appear
1. Campbell, Courts and Prosecutors Are the Weak Link in Preventing Drunken
Driving, 46 A.B.A.J. 43 (1960). The article gathers data from numerous sources
to support its contention that alcohol causes more accidents than is generally
conceded. "The largest single factor in our present motorcar death and injury
problem is the drinking driver." Id. at 45. That such a statement correctly de-
scribes local problems is supported by a statement of Mr. Raymond I. Harris,
Coroner of St. Louis County, that 54 of the 83 fatal accidents occurring in St.
Louis County during 1958 involved drinking drivers. St. Louis Globe-Democrat,
Nov. 6, 1959, p. 12, col. 1 (quoted in editorial).
2. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 564.460 (1949).
3. These body fluids are blood, breath, urine, saliva and spinal fluid. See
Muehlberger, Alcohol and Traffic Accidents, a pamphlet distributed by the North-
western University Traffic Institute, at 9. See also 25 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 36
(1956).
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to be sober and yet be incapable of driving a car safely,4 some way
must be found to use these tests effectively to remove drinking drivers
from the roads. In examining cases involving chemical testing, it is
essential that various factual differences be noted, for upon these
differences the question of admissibility often turns. Cases may
arise where defendant (1) consents to the test, (2) is coerced into
submitting to the test, (3) is incapable of consenting to the test, or
(4) refuses the test and none is given. Problems which commonly
arise in each of these situations will be discussed.
1. Defendant Consents to the Test.
Generally, results of chemical tests for intoxication are admissible
if the defendant has consented.5 Problems can arise, however, if the
prosecution fails to show general scientific acceptance of the test6 or
that the person testifying to the results of the test is sufficiently well-
trained to qualify as an expert. 7 Similarly, the chain of custody of the
sample may not be shown or there may be questions about whether
the sample has been allowed to become contaminated.$ It has been
4. "Two 12 oz. bottles of 3.2% beer or 2 oz. of 100 proof whiskey consumed
within one hour will put the average moderate drinker in the zone of impaired
driving ability . . . . [He] is a potential menace on the highway." Campbell,
supra note 1, at 45. This article criticizes the widespread practice of not charging
as drunk any person whose blood has less than a 0.15% alcoholic content by weight.
The percentage is the one used in the Model Chemical Test Law as the minimum
for a presumption of intoxication, and was set high enough to be unassailable.
5. See, e.g., Spitler v. State, 221 Ind. 107, 46 N.E.2d 591 (1943); State v.
Morkrid, 286 N.W. 412 (Iowa 1939); City of Columbus v. Thompson, 55 Ohio
App. 302, 89 N.E.2d 604 (1949) ; Marshall v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 268, 262 S.W.2d
491 (1953) ; State v. McMurray, 47 Wash. 2d 128, 286 P.2d 684 (1955).
6. Blood and urine tests for intoxication have long been generally conceded
to be valid. See Ladd & Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to
Determine Intoxication, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191, 267 (1939). Other tests questioned
by some authorities may yet be admissible. The divergent view may be held to
affect the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. See, e.g., McKay v.
State, 155 Tex. Crim. 416, 235 S.W.2d 173 (1950).
7. E.g., State v. Williams, 245 Iowa 401, 62 N.W.2d 241 (1954); Fortune v.
State, 197 Tenn. 691, 277 S.W.2d 381 (1955). A lay witness is qualified to testify
to usual signs of intoxications, such as staggering, incoherent speech, etc. A pos-
sible problem may arise, however, since such symptoms may be produced by an
overdose or lack of insulin, if the individual is a diabetic, or by inhaling carbon
monoxide fumes, a blow on the head, kidney trouble, nerve disorders, overdoses of
barbiturates or othey drugs, or many other causes. See Muehlberger, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 3. See also People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N.E.2d 567 (1951),
for a lengthy discussion of the problem of detecting intoxication without a chemical
test.
8. Suggestions for overcoming these problems may be found in Ladd & Gibson,
supra note 6, at 262. Evidence has been held inadmissible when proper handling
has not been shown. E.g., Riddle v. State, 288 P.2d 761 (Okla. Crim. 1955);
Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 90 S.E.2d 257 (1955).
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contended that the taking of a fluid sample violates the privilege
against self-incrimination even when the defendant has consented,
but this argument commonly has been rejected.9 If the sample is pro-
cured by a doctor, there exists the possibility of invasion of the
physician-patient privilege. 0 Finally, as with any evidence problem,
there may be instances in which the hearsay rule is violated or the
proper foundation is not laid." Careful preparation can usually avoid
such occurrences; hence this aspect will not be further discussed.
Because of the widely acknowledged scientific accuracy of many of
the tests, 1 2 it is believed that there will be an increasing tendency to
adopt a rationale that will lead to freer admissibility in "consent"
cases. Some courts have found "consent" in situations in which the
average laymen would say none was present. Thus, in State v. Small,1
defendant was held to have consented to a test when he allowed it
only after being told by the examining physician that unless he per-
mitted the taking of a blood sample, the physician would testify that
defendant was drunk. Courts have found little difficulty in holding
that a person may be too drunk to drive and yet be quite capable of
consenting to a test.1 4 Still another approach is the rule that failure
to object amounts to consent,5 which rule shifts to the defendant the
burden of proving lack of consent.
It should be noted that in cases where consent is disputed, regard-
less of who has the burden of proof, there is a probability that the
jury will get the results of the test before it, inasmuch as the question
of consent itself is for the jury. 6 Thus if there is conflicting evi-
dence, the most for which defendant may hope is a limiting instruction
that the results must be disregarded if the jury should find no consent.
This approach parallels the rule for coerced confessions followed in
many states.17
9. See cases cited in note 5 supra. However, not all courts require consent.
State v. Berg, 70 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953); People v. Kiss, 125 Cal. App. 2d
138, 269 P.2d 924 (1954).
10. See, e.g., Alder v. State, 154 N.E.2d 716 (Ind. 1958) (blood sample pro-
cured from unconscious defendant held inadmissible). Cf. Clapp v. State, 73 Okla.
Crim. 260, 120 P.2d 381 (1941) (defendant held to have waived privilege). See
cases cited in note 41 infra which admit evidence over objection that doctor-
patient privilege was violated.
11. E.g., State v. Gagnon, 151 Me. 501, 121 A.2d 345 (1956) (held hearsay for
a doctor to testify to results of blood test when he took no part in the analysis).
12. See note 3 supra.
13. 233 Iowa 1280, 11 N.W.2d 377 (1943).
14. See, e.g., Bowden v. State, 246 P.2d 427 (Okla. Crim. 1952) ; Jones v. State,
159 Tex. Crim. 29, 261 S.W.2d 161 (1953).
15. Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 547, 18 So. 2d 752 (1944); State v. Ayres,
70 Idaho 18, 211 P.2d 142 (1949).
16. State v. Daugherty, 320 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. 1959).
17. See generally McCormick, Evidence § 111 (1954).
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2. Defendant is Coerced Into Submitting to the Test.
Coercing defendant into submitting to a test also may be analogized
to the coerced confession situation. In many cases, counsel have tried
to invoke the rules relating to coerced confessions and the closely
related rules protecting against self-incrimination.1s Often, both con-
siderations are treated under the general category of self-incrimi-
nation, and roughly speaking, courts have followed the same divergent
rules in dealing with chemical tests which they apply generally to all
problems of self-incrimination.0
The Missouri rule, as stated in State v. Newcomb,20 is that admis-
sion of any evidence obtained through coercion of the defendant vio-
lates his right against self-incrimination. In the Newcomb case, de-
fendant had been compelled to submit to a medical examination to
determine if he had a venereal disease. In 1959 the Supreme Court
of Missouri, faced with a blood test case, was able to avoid ruling on
whether a coerced test violated the self-incrimination privilege, since
defendant did not ask for a jury instruction on voluntariness.21 The
court did, however, cite Newcomb with no apparent disapproval. 22
Therefore, it appears that the Missouri courts would treat a coerced
chemical test in the same way in which they treat a coerced confession.
Another view of self-incrimination is found in Texas decisions,
which have treated the compelling of an "affirmative act" as a vio-
lation of the privilege against self-incrimination. In Apodaca v.
State,23 the conviction was reversed because the defendant was re-
quired to give a urine specimen; as compulsion of an affirmative act,
this was held to violate his privilege. Although the "affirmative act
doctrine" would seem to permit admission of test results obtained
without active participation of the defendant, a recent Texas case
indicates that chemical test results, whether obtained from an active
or passive defendant, are always inadmissible if the defendant has
not consented. -4 Obviously this greatly limits the "affirmative act
doctrine" regardless of how much latitude the court is allowed in
which to make its own characterization of a given act as active or
passive.
Many recent cases have refused to analogize the chemical test prob-
lem to that of coerced confessions. These cases adopt the approach of
18. E.g., Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512 (1951) ; State v. Alexander,
7 N.J. 585, 83 A.2d 441 (1951) ; State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945).
19. Discussion of the three major views of self-incrimination generally may
be found in 8 Wigmore, Evidence §h 2263-66 (3d ed. 1940).
20. 220 Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405 (1909).
21. State v. Daugherty, 320 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. 1959).
22. Id. at 589.
23. 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940).
24. Trammell v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 543, 287 S.W.2d 487 (1956).
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Wigmore,25 that a compelled chemical test, unlike a compelled oral
statement, will be reliable since no amount of coercion can alter a
physical fact. Courts following the Wigmore view limit the privilege
against self-incrimination to testimonial utterances.20 Thus, in State
v. Alexander,27 the defendant was constrained to give a breath sample
by the forceful and compelling manner of the police officers. In ad-
mitting the evidence, the Oklahoma court held that constitutional
protection against self-incrimination did not "justify the enlargement
of [the] clause to cover 'real' or 'physical' evidence. 2 8
Coercion of itself is distasteful and there have been judicial at-
tempts to curtail it, based upon due process. All cases involving use
of physical coercion should be tested against the frequently cited case
of Rochin v. California.9 There the Supreme Court of the United
States indicated that it is a denial of due process for a state to admit
evidence obtained as a result of shockingly brutal police conduct. In
the specific area of chemical testing, however, the Supreme Court has
ruled that a blood sample obtained in the normal manner from an
unconscious defendant is not tantamount to brutality, and evidence
regarding the sample is admissible. 30  Therefore, exclusion of the
results of a coerced chemical test as violative of due process would
necessitate a showing that the sample was obtained in a way which
"shocks the conscience." 31 There are several cases which indicate a
considerable degree of force may be employed without making the
test results inadmissible. In State v. Berg,32 police officers strapped
the arms of the defendant behind him and managed to obtain a breath
sample. The Arizona court upheld the conviction, saying that a person
must submit to a chemical test for intoxication, and if the individual
refuses, necessary force may be used to subdue him.
25. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2263 (3d ed. 1940).
26. See, e.g., cases cited note 18 supra.
27. 305 P.2d 572 (Okla. Crim. 1956).
28. Id. at 584.
29. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). This decision provoked an abundance of law review
comment. See, e.g., 40 Calif. L. Rev. 311 (1952) ; 21 Fordham L. Rev. 287 (1952) ;
66 Harv. L. Rev. 122 (1952); 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1367 (1952); 1952 Wash. U.L.Q.
471.
30. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). Three justices dissented in the
Breithaupt case. These justices felt that the Rochin case had been decided not
because of the use of force by police, but because it was a denial of due process
to invade the body of a man to obtain evidence to use against him. This case
also caused much comment, e.g., 71 Harv. L. Rev. 161 (1957); 1957 U. Ill. L.F. 315;
26 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 55 (1957), but the decision leaves little doubt that in the
area of chemical testing, only brutality "shocks the conscience."
31. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
32. 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953).
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3. Defendant Is Incapable of Giving Consent.
Even if the Wigmore approach to self-incrimination is adopted, and
there are no due process objections, admissibility is not assured. Ob-
taining a sample of defendant's bodily fluids for subjection to a chem-
ical test may constitute an unreasonable search2 3 If the search is held
unreasonable, the test result would be inadmissible, all questions of
self-incrimination aside, in states such as Missouri which follow the
exclusionary rule barring evidence obtained by unreasonable search
and seizure.
On the other hand, courts which adopt the Wigmore approach to
self-incrimination and also admit illegally obtained evidence will
almost certainly admit chemical tests obtained from subjects incapable
of giving their consent. For example, in Block v. People,4 the Colo-
rado court admitted into evidence a blood sample obtained from an
unconscious person. It should be noted that since the legality of the
search was immaterial to the Colorado court, it did not have to pass
on whether such a blood test was illegal or not. Wisconsin, a juris-
diction with the exclusionary rule, has held, in a case factually similar
to the Block case, that taking the blood was an unreasonable search
and seizure and that the evidence of the test results should therefore
be excluded.
From this it might appear that taking blood from an unconscious
person is an unreasonable search and seizure, and that the only ques-
tion is whether the jurisdiction concerned adopts the exclusionary
33. In State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945), evidence was admitted
under the Wigmore self-incrimination view, but it was pointed out in the con-
curring opinion that had the argument been made that the evidence was obtained
by an illegal search, the result might have been different. Many states refuse to
admit evidence obtained by unreasonable searches and seizures. See Annot., 50
A.L.R.2d 531 (1956).
34. 125 Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512 (1951). For similar holdings in similar fact
situations see People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953); State v.
Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 211 P.2d 142 (1949); Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 N.M. 385, 271
P.2d 827 (1954); State v. Cash, 219 N.C. 818, 15 S.E.2d 277 (1941); Common-
wealth v. Statti, 166 Pa. Super. 577, 73 A.2d 688 (1950). Except for Idaho, all
the jurisdictions named above normally admit illegally obtained evidence. The
result in the Idaho case can be explained on the basis of the peculiar fact situation
preent-the test results showed that the defendant was not intoxicated. Cf. State
v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950); State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585,
83 A.2d 441 (1950).
35. State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956). The holding is
particularly significant since Wisconsin adopts Wigmore's view of self-incrimina-
tion. City of Barron v. Covey, 271 Wis. 10, 72 N.W.2d 387 (1955); Green Lake
County v. Domes, 247 Wis. 90, 18 N.W.2d 348 (1945) (evidence of intoxication
obtained by a forced medical examination held admissible. No chemical tests were
involved).
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rule. A recent California case,36 however, shows that such a conclu-
sion is not necessarily compelled. California only recently adopted the
exclusionary rule37 but subsequently has admitted evidence of a blood
sample obtained from a defendant who was semi-conscious. The basis
for the decision appears to be that taking a blood sample from a
non-consenting person by non-brutal means does not constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure because it is not unreasonable. The
significance of the case is enhanced because the defendant had not
been arrested when the sample was taken, so the search was not
incidental to arrest. The court, in answering defendant's argument on
this point, stated that when there are reasonable grounds for arrest,
the search is not unlawful merely because it precedes rather than
follows the arrest.38 It is submitted that in spite of this decision,
whether or not the defendant was arrested upon reasonable grounds
prior to the search, may well be determinative of the issue of the
legality of the test.39
36. People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957).
37. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
38. 48 Cal. 2d at 771, 312 P.2d at 693.
39. The court in the Duroncelay case cited three earlier California decisions
to support the contention that a search is not unlawful merely because it precedes
rather than follows the arrest. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855
(1955); People v. Boyles, 45 Cal. 2d 652, 290 P.2d 535 (1955); People v. Simon,
45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955). The Simon case contains the most extensive
discussion of the problem, and concludes that search prior to arrest is consistent
with the view of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Whether such a conclusion is sound is dubious.
In the Rabinowitz case, the court made this statement: "[N]o one questions the
right, without a search warrant, to search the person after a valid arrest." 339
U.S. at 60. (Emphasis added.) The court continued by pointing out that the
validity of a search is dependent initially upon a valid arrest. The view of the
California court can be justified only because a search before arrest is not per-
mitted unless valid grounds for arrest existed prior to the search. In the Simon
case, the court said "if the person searched is innocent and the search convinces
the officer that his reasonable belief to the contrary is erroneous, it is to the ad-
vantage of the person searched not to be arrested." 45 Cal. 2d at 648, 290 P.2d at
533. In view of the stigma attaching to a person with an arrest record, it cannot
be denied that a person who could be legally arrested would be well advised to
submit to a search if it would avoid an arrest. If reasonable grounds for arrest
exist, it would seem an exaltation of form over substance if in a given fact
situation, evidence obtained would be either admitted or not admitted depending
upon whether or not the officer uttered the words, "You are under arrest." In
spite of this, it is felt that most courts would adhere to the more traditional
approach, and admit evidence from searches only if made after valid arrests. For
a discussion of the historical background of search incident to arrest, see Way,
Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 Wash. U.L.Q. 261-62.
Since driving while intoxicated is a felony in Missouri, there is no chance for a
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When a sample is taken from an unconscious person by a doctor, at
least one case has held that permitting the doctor to testify about
taking the sample violates the physician-patient privilege,40 but there
is contrary authority.
41
4. Defendant Refuses the Test and None is Given.
In this area an attempt often is made to analogize refusal to take
a chemical test to refusal to take the witness stand in a criminal case.
Most jurisdictions do not permit comment on the accused's failure to
testify.- It is argued that comment on failure to take a chemical
test should not be permitted because a person has a constitutional
right to refuse a test, and to permit testimony that defendant refused
the test would discourage the exercise of this constitutional right.
Several factors make this analogy incorrect. First, under the Wig-
more doctrine of self-incrimination, which views the results of a
chemical test as non-testimonial, nothing concerning the test could
be held to violate the privilege. In contrast, compelling the accused
to take the stand and testify does violate the privilege. Permitting
comment on a refusal to take the test therefore does not in any way
violate the privilege, while permitting comment on a refusal to take
the stand does. Secondly, the accused is protected from comment on
his failure to take the stand by specific statutes.43 Absent a statute
prohibiting comment on failure to take a test, comment should be per-
mitted. It should be noted that many writers 44 feel that comment
should be permitted regarding failure to testify. Such a view cer-
tainly would oppose extension without a statute of a doctrine thought
to be unsound to the area of chemical testing where it has no proper
application.4n
drunk driving arrest to be illegal, provided the arresting officer had reasonable
grounds for believing the arrested person was operating an automobile while under
the influence of alcohol.
40. Alder v. State, 154 N.E.2d 716 (Ind. 1958).
41. Hanlon v. Woodhouse, 113 Colo. 504, 160 P.2d 998 (1945) ; People v. Barnes,
197 Misc. 477, 98 N.Y.S.2d 481 (County Ct. 1950); Schwartz v. Schneuringer, 269
Wis. 535, 69 N.W.2d 756 (1955). Cf. Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512
(1952) (statute defining physician-patient privilege held not to apply to nurses or
medical technicians). It is submitted that the physician-patient privilege should be
applied only when the sample was used in treatment of the patient.
42. The various statutes prohibiting comment are set out at 2 Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 488 (3d ed. 1940).
43. Ibid.
44. See, e.g., McCormick, Evidence § 132 (1954); Vanderbilt, Minimum Stand-
ards of Judicial Administration 381 (1949). For a discussion of the policy factors
behind permitting comment, see State v. Baker, 115 Vt. 94, 53 A.2d 53 (1947)
(upholding state statute permitting comment).
45. See, e.g., Wigmore's discussion at 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2265 (3d ed.
1940).
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The cases that have dealt with the problem raised when comment
is made on refusal to submit to a test are not in agreement.40 At least
one holding47 that comment could not be made is distinguishable since
the state had a statute forbidding chemical tests without the defen-
dant's consent. If the state is one which permits comment on refusal
of an accused to testify, the likelihood is that comment on refusal to
take a chemical test would be permitted. Such a result was obtained
in a recent California case,48 although the basis of the decision was
that a chemical test is not within the purview of the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Summary of Evidentiary Problems Regarding Chemical Testing.
It is apparent that before chemical intoxication test results will be
generally admissible, a number of formidable legal hurdles must be
cleared. Whether or not test results will be admitted in a given case
will depend of course upon the facts of the case and the law of the
jurisdiction. Generally, problems may be expected to arise in the
areas of self-incrimination, unreasonable search and seizure and due
process. These by no means are the only potential bars to admissi-
bility, but certainly the most serious.4 9
With regard to Missouri law in particular, at least two, and possibly
all three, of the major problems stand in the way of admissibility.
Missouri's definition of self-incrimination is as broad as that of any
state,50 and the rule excluding illegally obtained evidence is in force.51
If obtaining the sample involves use of any brutality, there un-
doubtedly would be no hesitancy to draw upon the Rochin case as
authority for refusing admission to test results, should other reasons
to exclude not be present. Missouri has held that chemical test results
cannot be admitted unless consent is shown,52 and it appears that
46. Permitting comment: State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275 (1941) ;
State v. Nutt, 78 Ohio App. 336, 65 N.E.2d 675 (1946); State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio
App. 192,20 N.E.2d 265 (1938) ; State v. Smith, 230 S.C. 164,94 S.E.2d 886 (1956) ;
Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d 614 (1954); City of Barron v.
Covey, 271 Wis. 10, 72 N.W.2d 387 (1955). Not permitting comment: People v.
Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1955); State v. Severson, 75
N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956); Bumpass v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 423, 271 S.W.2d
953 (1954).
47. State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956). The statute which pro-
hibited chemical tests without defendant's consent is N.D. Rev. Code § 39-0801
(Supp. 1957).
48. People v. Conterno, 170 Cal. App. 2d 817, 339 P.2d 968 (1959).
49. See notes 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 supra, and accompanying text.
50. State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405 (1909) ; State v. Horton, 247
Mo. 657, 153 S.W. 1051 (1913).
51. State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100 (1924).
52. State v. Daugherty, 320 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. 1959).
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evidence of a refusal to take a test also would be inadmissible.5 3 At
present, the only clear way to get chemical test results admitted is for
the prosecution to prove that the defendant consented to the test. In
such a situation it is obvious that chemical testing is practically with-
out value in Missouri, serving neither to secure convictions nor to
deter drinking drivers from use of the roads.
II. THE PROBLEM OF SEVERE SANCTION-"DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED IS A FELONY"
Unless the punishment can be tailored to fit the crime, no useful
purpose is to be served by making chemical test results more freely
admissible. The fact that driving while intoxicated carries full felony
sanctions in Missouri means that rarely will any but the most aggra-
vated cases of drunken driving be punished. For although the "driver
who drinks but is not drunk" is a definite danger to the public, 4
prosecutors and jurors are understandably reluctant to make felons
of such persons. As a result, usually no punishment at all is meted
out. Chemical test results would be useful chiefly in the "drinking
but not drunk" cases,:- but it is apparent that making the results
generally admissible would be of little or no practical consequence,
inasmuch as it still would be unlikely under the present felony statute
that such cases would even be prosecuted. Moreover, even if the cases
were prosecuted, juries could choose to ignore scientifically irrefutable
fact in order to prevent sending fellow citizens to the penitentiary.
One obvious solution would be to lessen the statutory penalty. Re-
alistically, however, this possibility is a very remote one since the
average legislator undoubtedly would prefer to avoid having to justify
to his constituents why he favored reducing the penalty for "drunken
driving."
III. A MODIFIED "IMPLIED CONSENT" STATUTE
AS A SUGGESTED SOLUTION
An "implied consent" statute seeks to avoid all the evidence prob-
lems which may be raised in the area of chemical tests for intoxication
by providing that a driver by his use of the roads is deemed to have
53. This would follow from the Missouri view that one has a constitutional
right not to be tested. Texas, with a view of self-incrimination quite similar to
Missouri's has decided that it is improper to admit evidence on defendant's refusal
to take an intoxication test. Bumpass v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 423, 271 S.W.2d
953 (1954).
54. See note 4 supra.
55. A layman is qualified to testify to the signs of obvious drunkenness. But
one who is not outwardly intoxicated cannot be shown to be affected by alcohol
without scientific proof.
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consented to chemical testing56 Implicit in such a law is the principle
that a person can be required in advance to waive any constitutional
privilege, such as that against self-incrimination, in return for the
privilege of using the public roads. The ultimate determination of
constitutionality naturally is dependent upon whether the courts de-
cide that the public interest in safer roads outweighs the private
interest of retaining privilege to refuse a chemical test.
Courts have been confronted with this same basic determination in
ruling on "hit-and-run" statutes.5 7 Such a statute provides that if a
driver is involved in an accident in which there is property damage
or personal injury, he must report the accident to the authorities. In
the first cases arising under these laws it was argued that drivers
were being forced to give self-incriminatory evidence in violation of
their constitutional rights. When presented with this argument, the
New York court held that even if the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation were involved, one could be required to waive it." Use of the
highways is a privilege which may be withheld altogether by the
legislature; hence it is subject to reasonable regulation.
In the Missouri case of Ex Parte Kneedler," it was held that despite
the possible presence of a self-incrimination problem, Missouri's hit-
and-run statute was a reasonable exercise of the police power of the
state. It is therefore submitted that the Missouri courts would sus-
tain in like fashion the validity of an implied consent statute in the
area of chemical testing for intoxicated drivers.
However, an implied consent statute would not solve Missouri's
problem unless modified so as to limit its sanctions solely to suspen-
56. "Implied consent statutes" are in force in Idaho, Kansas, New York, Utah
and Puerto Rico. Idaho Code Ann. § 49-352 (1957) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-1001
(Supp. 1957); N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 70-a (1958); P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
9, § 183(3)-(8) (Supp. 1958); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1959).
The New York "implied consent" statute approving the waiver theory was
upheld in People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Spec. Sess. 1954) ;
Anderson v. McDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Schutt v.
McDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Supp. Ct. 1954) (former statute held
invalid on other grounds).
See Weinstein, Statute Compelling Submission to a Chemical Test for Intoxica-
tion, 45 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S., 541 (1955) for an illuminating discussion of the
statute. Professor Weinstein was assistant counsel for the committee that drafted
the New York statute. See also the Interim Report of the New York Joint Legis-
lative Committee on Motor Vehicle Problems, Chemical Tests for Intoxication,
Legislative Documents (1953).
Use of the waiver theory to compel chemical testing was originally suggested in
Mamet, Constitutionality of Chemical Tests to Determine Alcoholic Intoxication,
36 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 132 (1945).
57. The Missouri hit-and-run statute is Mo. Rev. Stat. § 564.450 (1949).
5. People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913).
59. 243 Mo. 632, 147 S.W. 983 (1912).
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sion of the driving privilege, otherwise the severe-sanction dilemma
of the felony statute would thwart effective enforcement. All evidence
obtained by means of the new statute should therefore be made in-
admissible in other criminal proceedings. In this manner no one
would be sent to the penitentiary because of inability to assert any
of his constitutional rights. Necessary flexibility can be attained by
graduating the period of license suspension according to the degree
of intoxication.,,
The following is submitted as a suggested framework or basic out-
line for an implied consent statute in Missouri:
Section 1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this
state thereby consents to the giving and taking of any fluid or
fluids of his body, as illustrated by but not limited to blood,
breath, urine and saliva, if such fluid can be subjected to an
analysis which can determine the concentration of alcohol in the
blood of a person.
Section 2. The director of the division of health shall prepare
and keep current a list of body fluids that can be subjected to
analysis to determine the concentration of alcohol in the blood
of a person for purposes of this act.
Section 3. Until a list of body fluids is prepared under section 2
of this act, samples of blood, breath, urine and saliva may be
taken and analyzed.
Section 4. Whenever the director of the division of health
recognizes a certain body fluid to be susceptible to analysis to
determine the concentration of alcohol in the blood, he shall:
(a) Establish a procedure for taking samples of the fluid.
(b) Establish qualifications for persons who may procure
samples of the fluid.
(c) Establish qualifications for persons who may analyze
the fluid.
Section 5. Until procedures for procuring body fluid samples
and qualifications for persons who may take the samples and con-
duct the analysis are established under section 4 of this act, any
person is qualified to take a sample of urine, breath or saliva,
provided that the sample or samples are taken under circum-
stances that assure lack of contamination. Only a person qualified
by training and experience, as ilustrated by but not limited to
a doctor or medical technician, is permitted to take a blood
sample, until other persons are qualified under section 4 of this
60. Percentages of alcohol used in the statute are based upon those in the
Model Chemical Test Law which presumes defendant not to be under the influence
of alcohol if his blood had less than a 0.05% alcoholic content by weight. If the
percentage figure is between 0.05 and 0.15 there is no presumption either for or
against intoxication, but such fact may be considered with other competent evi-
dence. One authority has stated "the vast majority of persons show measurable
deterioration when the blood alcohol is 0.05 per cent or over." Campbell, supra
note 1, at 45.
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act. Until the director of the division of health shall establish
qualifications for persons who may analyze samples of body fluids
to determine alcoholic content under section 4 of this act, such
analysis may be made by any qualified person, as illustrated by
but not limited to chemists, physicians and laboratory technicians.
Section 6. No person shall be required under this act to furnish
a body fluid sample unless he shall first have been arrested by a
law enforcement officer having reason to believe that the person
has been operating a motor vehicle while his operating ability
was impaired because of the influence of alcohol.
Section 7. If an arrested person refuses to furnish a body fluid
sample upon request of a law enforcement officer, the arrested
person has revoked his consent and no sample shall be taken.
The arresting officer shall sign and file with the director of rev-
enue a sworn report stating that he had reason to believe the
person was operating a motor vehicle while his driving ability was
impaired because of the influence of alcohol and that the person
failed to furnish the body fluid sample when lawfully requested.
Upon receipt of such report, the director of revenue immediately
shall suspend the arrested person's driving privilege for a period
of nine months.
Section 8. If the arrested person does not refuse to furnish a
body fluid sample, the sample shall be analyzed in a manner
authorized by this act. The person supervising or conducting the
analysis shall sign and file with the director of revenue a sworn
report of his findings as to the alcoholic content of the fluid and
the arresting officer shall sign and file with the director of rev-
enue a sworn report stating that he had reason to believe that
the arrested person was operating a motor vehicle while his
driving ability was impaired because of the influence of alcohol.
Section 9. If the reports prepared under section 8 of this act
show that the concentration of alcohol in an arrested person's
blood exceeded 0.05% by weight, but was less than 0.10% by
weight, the director of revenue immediately shall suspend the
arrested person's driving privilege for a period of three months.
Section 10. If the reports prepared under section 8 of this act
show that the concentration of alcohol in an arrested person's
blood exceeded 0.10% by weight, but was less than 0.15% by
weight, the director of revenue immediately shall suspend the
arrested person's driving privilege for a period of six months.
Section 11. If the reports prepared under section 8 of this act
show that the concentration of alcohol in an arrested person's
blood exceeded 0.15% by weight, the director of revenue imme-
diately shall suspend the arrested person's driving privilege for
a period of nine months.
Section 12. Whether or not an arrested person refuses to
furnish a body fluid sample or samples, neither the fact of refusal
nor the results of the analysis of the sample or samples shall be
admitted into evidence or used against the interests of the ar-
rested person in any criminal proceeding in this state, inde-
pendently of this act.
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It should be noted that this proposed outline for an implied consent
statute is incomplete to the extent that it fails to include procedures
for administrative review and appeal. There should be a provision
for such procedures, with a further provision that the license be
suspended pending review or appeal. Another desirable feature would
be a prior-offense point system provision in order to bar repeated
violators from the road permanently.
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